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ABSTRAK
 Hubungan Indonesia dengan Tiongkok memulai babak baru dengan penandatanganan kemitraan strategis 
pada tahun 2005. Penandatanganan tersebut dan kesamaan pada kebangkitan pembangunan infrastruktur di 
kedua negara mendorong peningkatan arus modal dan kerjasama. Di bawah kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo 
yang mengusung program Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) dengan tujuan membangun konektifitas domestik, 
telah membuka peluang kerjasama bagi Tiongkok untuk menanamkan modal dan membangun kerjasama yang 
saling melengkapi dengan program Belt Road Initiatives (BRI). Meskipun peluang besar terbuka bagi kedua 
pihak, masih terdapat ganjalan bagi terbangunnya kerjasama yang lebih mendalam. Prinsip politik luar negeri 
Indonesia tidak memungkinkan Indonesia untuk sepenuhnya menggantungkan atau beraliansi dengan kekuatan 
besar di kawasan ataupun global. Indonesia sendiri telah lama menjalankan aktifisme internasional yang 
berdasarkan prinsip bebas aktif dan keseimbangan dinamis. Prinsip-prinsip tersebut menjadi dasar rujukan 
bagi middlepowermanship dalam politik luar negeri Indonesia. Tantangannya dalam hal ini adalah bagaimana 
upaya Indonesia menyeimbangkan antara kepentingan politik dan ekonominya. Perkembangan hubungan 
ekonomi dengan Tiongkok dapat membantu Indonesia melaksanakan pembangunan infrastruktur strategis yang 
akan berdampak pada peningkatan kapabilitas ekonomi. Namun begitu, kedekatan yang tidak terimbangi akan 
dapat mengganggu politik luar negerinya sebagai kekuatan negara menengah (middlepowermanship). Artikel 
ini bertujuan mengetahui bagaimana Indonesia mengimbangi beragam kepentingan tersebut tanpa mengganggu 
posisi dan kredibilitasnya sebagai negara kekuatan menengah. Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa tanpa mengabaikan 
peranan faktor domestik, pada saat yang bersamaan Indonesia perlu membangun jalinan kerjasama dengan 
negara lain, terutama yang sejalan dengan penguatan sentralitas ASEAN demi perlindungan prinsip keseimbangan 
dinamis dan peranannya sebagai penjembatan di antara kekuatan besar.
Kata kunci: Global Maritime Fulcrum, middlepowermanship, keseimbangan dinamis, penjembatan, diplomasi  
       membumi
ABSTRACT 
 The relation between Indonesia and China sparks a new era by the signing of a strategic partnership 
agreement in 2005. The signing of strategic partnership and similarities in infrastructure booming in both countries 
initiates the significant flow of capital and cooperation. Under the presidency of Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s 
program of domestic connectivity, which dubbed as Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), has opened more extensive 
opportunity for China to invest and build complementarities of her Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). Despite the 
fact that two countries could move into a strategic partnership, other factors have hampered the relations between 
the two. Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine will not allow herself to become fully aligned with other great power 
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INTRODUCTION
 Indonesia and China relations have 
been growing since President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) successfully signing a 
strategic partnership (2005) and comprehensive 
strategic partnership (2013) (Mingming & 
Xiaochun, 2015). In spite of that, since President 
Joko Widodo take in charge as president in 
2014, Indonesia and China could bring a new 
leap forward since Jokowi main program of 
Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) is regarded as 
complementary with China’s 21st Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR) (Pradhan, 2016, 11). The program 
formally launched by President Jokowi during 
East Asian Summit conference in Myanmar 
in mid of November 2014. In front of leaders 
of regional powers and member countries, 
President Jokowi stated that Indonesia would 
position herself as a maritime fulcrum between 
two oceans and take responsibility to play a 
strategic role amid dynamic of geographic, 
economic and political turbulence (Witular, 
2014b). 
 Since the launching, GMF has generated 
discussion on the nature of the program. At the 
launching, President Jokowi stressed on the 
external aspect of the program that posited it as 
Indonesia’s strategy in managing regional power 
dynamics. However several details of GMF could 
be said that the program put more emphasize on 
domestic aspect before it could respond positively 
to regional dynamics. National development 
concern rather than playing an active role in 
the international stage was considered Jokowi’s 
way to distinguish his administration from 
his predecessor, President SBY (Wicaksana, 
2017, 7). Some scholars consider GMF as 
Jokowi’s flagship consist of continuation and 
distinction with the previous program of MP3EI 
(Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion 
of Indonesia’s Economic Development) under 
SBY’s presidency (Suproyanto, 2016). Both of 
the programs contain infrastructure development 
in Indonesia by building several connectivity 
projects. Nevertheless, the MP3EI never put 
emphasize on maritime sector, GMF has shifted 
away from the idea that was merely connecting 
center-hub Indonesia’s economic center to 
refocusing to the neglecting maritime aspect in 
most of Indonesian’s awareness (Sukma, 2014).
 Besides the fact that GMF concerning 
more on domestic aspect, Indonesia could not 
manage in implementing one of the leading 
elements of the program, internal connectivity, by 
relying solely on the domestic source. Under the 
presidency of Jokowi, Indonesia is direly in needs 
of foreign investment to achieve one aspect of 
the GMF. Indonesia since then puts its economic 
diplomacy mainly to attract foreign investment 
(Setiawan, 2015). In several international forums, 
Jokowi openly invites international businessmen 
and foreign capital to invest in Indonesia. 
 GMF since then has attempted to 
engage with the regional development of 
major power foreign policy strategy. GMF is 
dubbed as complementary with China’s 21st 
in the region. Indonesia has been long pursued an international activism based on free and active doctrine will 
not allow herself to become fully aligned with other great power politics in the region. Indonesia has been long 
pursued an international activism based on free and active doctrine and dynamic equilibrium. These doctrinal 
factors in another sense become the primary foundation of Indonesia’s middlepowermanship foreign policy. The 
challenge in this case is the contradiction between economic and political interests that has forced Indonesia to 
balance between her political interests and economic interests. While growing relations with China could help 
Indonesia implement her strategic infrastructure development that leads to a better economic capability, the 
situation could erode her aspiration as middle power country (middlepowermanship). This article would like to 
find how Indonesia juggles between those interest without undermining her position and credibility as an emerging 
middle power. This article proposes that even though domestic politics plays important role in fostering Indonesia 
position as middle power countries, at the same time Indonesia needs to strengthen her relations towards other 
countries and especially manage the centrality of ASEAN in the region to secure principle of dynamic equilibrium 
and the role of bridge builder.
Keywords: Global Maritime Fulcrum, middlepowermanship, dynamic equilibrium, bridge builder, down to earth
       diplomacy
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Maritime Silk Road, in which Indonesia could 
play a significant role to develop both countries 
programs successfully (Pattiradjawane & 
Soebagjo, 2015, 180).
China’s desire to create maritime 
connections from its coastal area with countries 
along Asia-Africa even reach up to Europe locates 
Indonesia’s strategic position as a crucial aspect. 
Several strategic sea-lanes of communications 
that could support the idea of China’s global 
maritime connections are under Indonesia 
jurisdiction. Presiden Xi Jinping also showed 
Indonesia strategic position when he announced 
programs of “21st Maritime Silk Road” before 
Indonesia’s Parliament in Jakarta on October 
2nd, 2013 (Hong, 2015, 3). Under the Jokowi’s 
presidency, China’s proposal for cooperation has 
moved forward to increase the congruency ideas 
of 21st Maritime Silk Road and Global Maritime 
Fulcrum. During his visit to Indonesia in 
November 2014, China’s Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi made four stages of connectivity between the 
countries, which consist of connectivity of two 
countries leader, down to practical cooperation 
(Chinese Embassy in Norway, 2014).
Despite China’s perceived congruency 
between 21st Maritime Silk Road and Global 
Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia is not left without 
dilemma. The campaign to attract foreign direct 
investment has pushed Jokowi’s administration 
to juggle with international donor which actually 
a reinterpretation of certain of the doctrine of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. During his presidency, 
SBY proclaimed that Indonesia must maintain 
its navigation under the global turbulence 
change, and maintaining dynamic equilibrium 
among the great power to keep the position of 
Indonesia’s free and independent foreign policy 
(Tan, 20107, 179). This kind of strategy of 
foreign policy has pushed SBY administration 
to keep a policy of “thousand friends and zero 
enemies” through actively involved in various 
international initiatives and forums (Connely, 
2015, 3). In rather different fashion, President 
Jokowi and Vice President Jusuf Kala would like 
to maintain Indonesia’s middle power position by 
selectively engaged global issues, while focusing 
on strengthening Indonesia’s role in the regional 
dynamic that they considered as related directly 
to Indonesia’s people and interest (Widodo & 
Kalla, 2014, 13). Indonesia’s foreign policy 
jargon under Jokowi latter famously quoted as 
“down to earth diplomacy” and “pro-people 
diplomacy (Antara, 2 February 2015).
Jokowi’s foreign policy during his early 
time of presidency seems to neglect the centrality 
of ASEAN. Indonesia appears to put more 
attention to achieve its domestic programs by 
focusing on its national interest in economic 
diplomacy. Challenges are thus considered to 
maintain its strategic partnership, built during 
SBY’s presidency and cordial relations with 
all neighbor countries without compromising 
domestic needs for investment and infrastructure 
development. Jokowi’s seemingly pragmatic 
foreign policy is required to maintain the balance 
between its national interests. According to 
Renne L. Pattiradjawane, Indonesia has to 
acknowledge that the development of domestic 
connectivity could be achieved without at least 
maintaining regional stability (2016, 8). Whether 
national development would sacrifice the idea 
of dynamic equilibrium is under serious issues. 
Beside external consideration, Global 
Maritime Fulcrum and China’s enthusiasm 
for cooperation have to encounter domestic 
challenges. Democratization process has made 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, and international 
cooperation will involve not only executive 
branch of the Indonesian government. Several 
studies have mentioned about the increasing 
role of parliament and society participation 
that influences Indonesia’s foreign policy. The 
democratization of Indonesia is also meant for 
acknowledgment of international-domestic 
nexus of foreign policy (Pattiradjawane, 2016; 
Wicaksana, 2017; Nabbs-Keller, 2013, 56-82). 
Indonesian people would perceive participation 
of foreign investor, not only from China, in 
Global Maritime Fulcrum not merely serve their 
development goals but concomitantly maintain 
Indonesia’s independence in the international 
forum. In this case, domestic perception is also 
appeared as a source of Indonesia’s aspiration to 
secure its middlepowermanship role (Santikajaya, 
2014). 
Under such condition, this article would 
like to focus on how the congruency of 21st 
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Maritime Silk Road and Global Maritime would 
affect Indonesia’s role as a bridge builder in 
maintaining its dynamic equilibrium. This article 
argues that under the dire needs of foreign capital 
to support domestic connectivity, Indonesia 
remains in requirements to maintain its dynamic 
equilibrium in its economic diplomacy. This idea 
could be achieved through widening the scope 
of its horizon in building congruency of Global 
Maritime Fulcrum with other regional countries. 
This article will consist several elaborations 
on the idea of Global Maritime Fulcrum and 
Indonesia Economic Diplomacy, congruency 
of GMF and 21st MSR and Indonesia-China 
relations, and legacy of SBY and Indonesia’s 
middle power foreign policy under Jokowi.
GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM 
AND INDONESIA’S ECONOMIC 
DIPLOMACY
President Jokowi during his launching 
speech of GMF in East Asian Summit states 
that Global Maritime Fulcrum is consist of 
five pillars; rebuild national maritime culture, 
maintain and manage marine resources, prioritize 
the development of maritime infrastructure 
and connectivity by constructing sea highway 
that connecting western and eastern port of 
Indonesia, maritime diplomacy, and maritime 
defense as a country located between two 
busy oceans (Witular, 2014a). The five pillars 
relate to an element of culture and manpower, 
economic cooperation and development, and 
political security element. Those five pillars are 
principally related and could be seen in isolation 
from one of another (Bandoro, 2014).
Proyek Tol Laut (Sea Highway) has made 
Indonesia’s GMF seems more inward looking 
(Negara & Das, 2017, 3). However, according 
to Rizal Sukma, one of foreign policy advisor 
since Jokowi-JK campaigning for presidency, 
Sea Highway Project is one among the three 
key elements of five pillars that is more concrete 
agenda in its implementation. The other elements 
that comprise all three elements of Global 
Maritime Fulcrum are building identity of marine 
culture and archipelagic nation and sense of 
common purpose to strengthening Indonesia’s 
position as a nation located between two strategic 
oceans (Sukma, 2014).
Implementation of Sea Highway Project 
is to connect five major ports from western 
part of Indonesia up to the eastern part. Those 
five main ports are Belawan in North Sumatra, 
Tanjung Priok in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak in East 
Java, Makassar in South Sulawesi, and Bitung 
in North Sulawesi. The five big ports would be 
supported with connection to several smaller 
ports across the archipelagic country. While the 
five major ports will function as international hub 
for cargo shipping, they will supply by product 
from nineteen smaller ports that play as feeder. 
All the nine teen smaller ports are Malahayati 
Ports in Aceh, Batam in Riau Archipelagic 
Province, Talang Duku in Jambi, Palembang 
in South Sumatera, Panjang, Teluk Bayur in 
West Sumatera, Tanjung Emas in Central Java, 
Pontianak ini West Kalimantan, Banjarmasin in 
South Kalimantan, Sampit in Central Kalimantan, 
Source: RPJMN 2015-2019 p. 9-57
Figure 1.  24 Strategic Ports in Source, Coen van Dijk, Pieter van de Mheen, & Martin Bloem, “Indonesia 
Maritime Hotspot Final Report,” (2015, 13) Tol Laut Project
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Balikpapan/Kanangau, Samarinda/Palaran in 
East Kalimantan, Tanau/Kupang in East Nusa 
Tenggara, Pantoloan in Central Sulawesi, Kendari 
in South East Sulawesi, Ternate in North Maluku, 
Ambon in Maluku, Sorong in West Papua and 
Jayapura in Papua (Communication and Public 
Information Bureau, Ministry of Transportation 
of Indonesia, 2015).
Sea Toll Policy is a sub-agenda of 
Nawacita (Nine Programs) to increase the 
people productivity and competitiveness in 
international market. The Tol Laut is to develop 
internal connectivity in order to equal distribution 
of development (Tim Pusat Kajian Sistem dan 
Hukum Administrasi Negara-LAN, 2015, 46). 
This is the main point of Sea Highway that 
distinguishes itself with previously known as 
Pendulum Nusantara Policy launched under the 
administration of SBY (Tim Pusat Kajian Sistem 
dan Hukum Administrasi Negara-LAN, 2015, 
3). The focus on infrastructure has been set up 
since MP3EI published by SBY’s second term 
of presidency in 2011 (Purba, 2012, 30). The 
Pendulum Nusantara stopped as shipping cargo 
program, of those 24 strategic ports. On the other 
hand, Sea Highway program will also include 
160 non-commercial ports as a sub-feeder of 
Sea Highway, building 50 pioneer shipping and 
193 pioneer shipping routes (Tim Pusat Kajian 
Sistem dan Hukum Administrasi Negara-LAN, 
2015, 48). This is an aspect of pro-people from 
Jokowi that was put on his campaign program.
 Despite the contention of whether 
Jokowi’s sea highway is a genuine project or 
merely continuation of concept from SBY’s 
administration, the important thing that should 
be capture is Jokowi’s plan to give more 
attention to implementation all development 
projects. This fact is reasonable according 
to Satria Sambijantoro (2014). Even though 
SBY’s administration has successfully achieve 
economic growth and high standing international 
stance for Indonesia, the administration could 
not fully catch the economic potential and 
the indecisive leadership of SBY has brought 
about slowness in infrastructure development in 
Indonesia. Sambijantoro referred to unfinished 
and postponed infrastructure projects under 
SBY’s administration. More importantly from all 
the projects are the MP3EI, which was the legacy 
of SBY’s administration, up to final months of 
SBY’s presidency only completed 3.2 percent 
of its yearly target in IDR 467 trillion, based 
on the data from the office of the Ministry of 
Coordinating Economic (Sambijantoro, 2014).
 Therefore, since the initial phase 
Global Maritime Fulcrum, aspects that catch 
attention of Jokowi’s administration and many 
international audiences are the elements of 
economic cooperation and infrastructure 
development. The third pillar is presumably the 
most daring project since it will cost at least Rp 
699 trillion (US$ 57.40 billion) to support Global 
Maritime Fulcrum ambition. The estimated 
total cost already included the investment of 24 
commercial seaports across the archipelago (Rp. 
243.6 trillion), 1,481 non-commercial harbors 
(Rp 198 trillion), and expense for acquiring the 
vessels needed (Rp 101.7 trillion). All of those 
investments aim to reduce logistic cost in the 
archipelagic country. National Development 
Planning Board (Bappenas), it will reduce the 
current of logistic expense 23.5 percent of GDP 
to 19.2 percent in 2019 (Natahadibrata, 2014). 
Bappenas has already acknowledged that state 
budget will not fully fund the sum of total 
investment. Indonesia itself during the national 
budget of 2016 and 2017 only allocated spending 
budget for infrastructure IDR 317.1 trillion and 
IDR 387.3 trillion (Negara & Das, 2017, 4). The 
two consecutive years budget shows that the state 
budget is far below the needed amount of capital.
 Indonesia Investment Coordinating 
Board (BKPM) in its Investment Strategic Plan 
2015-2019 shows that it will involve at least 30 
percent of private participation in the budget plan 
of infrastructure development in Indonesia. The 
project also shows that The State Budget will 
have to cover 40 percent of the total required 
funding, while the local government will jointly 
invest in infrastructure around 10 percent (van 
Dijk, van de Mheen, & Bloem, 2015, 13). This 
percentage of private participation will be much 
higher as shown in the National Ports Master 
Plan. In Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for 
developing the marine highway, private sector 
is expected to contribute up to 70%. Indonesia 
BKPM identifies four sources of funding for 
infrastructure development in Indonesia in its 
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budgeting plan 2015-2019. The full description 
of composition of budget plan is shown in the the 
table below (van Dijk, van de Mheen, & Bloem, 
2015, 12). 
 Besides the enormous amount of fund 
that will be used for financing the Sea Highway 
project, based on source budgeting also could 
be depicted that problem of coordination would 
appear among the various actors involved in this 
mega project. According to the table, Indonesia 
will have to established strategic coordination not 
only with the private sectors which are expected 
to share large sum of budget but also with the 
local governments in all the provinces and regents 
involve in this plan. Even though, government 
of Indonesia believes that it could meet the 
required fund by establishing Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) by passing the Presidential 
Regulation no. 38/2015 which supplanted the 
Presidential Regulation no. 67/2005 on PPP 
(PwC Indonesia, 2016, 32). Based on weakness 
of the rule from several projects in the past under 
such scheme of cooperation (Purba, 2012, 32), 
the new Presidential Regulation creates stimulus 
by offering a more conducive legal framework 
and increasing number of eligible sectors. 
 According to study by Aswicahyono and 
Friawan (2008), several crucial issues hindered 
the development of Indonesia infrastructure 
project ,  which consist  of insti tutional 
problems, financing issues, pricing issues and 
competition, corporatization and privatization 
issue (Aswicahyono & Friawan, 2008, 148). 
Aswicahyono and Friawan (2008) elaborate 
institutional issues and financing issues as 
problem-related with changing institution that 
Indonesia faces after it decentralized the authority 
to local government. Decentralization to certain 
extent has brought about several unsynchronized 
and uncertainly regulation between central and 
local government. The crucial problem resulted 
from decentralization, in the end, leads to 
hesitation from the private sector to participate 
in the infrastructure development (Aswicahyono 
& Friawan, 2008, 149). Another problem caused 
by contradiction of perception of decentralization 
by the local elites and the spirit of GMF, which is 
actually central government program. In this kind 
of relation, the local government often has vertical 
conflict with central government especially 
on issue of natural resources management 
(Wicaksana, 2017, 10-11). 
Table 1. BKPM Investment Strategic Plan 2015-2019
Source: Coen van Dijk, Pieter van de Mheen, & Martin Bloem, "Indonesia Maritime Hotspot Final Report,"  
             (2015, 13)
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 In financing issue, Aswicahyono and 
Friawan comment that only smaller amount 
can be attracted from national private sector. 
However, attracting international private sector 
and official development assistance are not an 
easy way out since the problem of regulation 
remains the bigger concern of international 
participation in Indonesia’s infrastructure 
(Aswicahyono & Friawan, 2008, 152). 
 Indonesia’s PPP remains entrapped in 
cumbersome process since it takes minimum of 
40 permits before the project could get permission 
to commence. In referring to information from 
Negara and Das (2017), Central Java power plant 
project took 50 licenses and permits before the 
construction. Both of the scholars also added that 
decentralization increases the complexities of the 
process (Negara & Das, 2017, 10).
 The government of Indonesia addresses 
the problem by creating the Committee for 
Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery 
(KPPIP) as in charge body for monitoring, 
coordinating and speeding up implementation 
the program of marine highway. The Committee 
is a centralized government body consists of 
Minister of Finance, Minister of PPN (National 
Development Planning)/Head of Bappenas 
(National Development Planning Agency), 
and Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial 
Planning. 
 The Coordination Ministry for Economic 
Affairs takes charge as leading institution of 
KPPIP. The committee has been instructed 
to select National Strategic Project (PSN, 
Proyek Strategis Nasional) as prioritized project 
based on President Regulation No. 3/2016 on 
Acceleration of the Implementation of National 
Strategic Projects (Negara & Das, 2017, 10). 
Another Presidential Regulation No. 58/2017 
later supersedes the Presidential Regulation No. 
3/2016. The national strategic project increases 
the number of involving project to become 245 
and additional 2 programs, which is electricity 
programs and aircraft industry program (KPPIP, 
2017).
 Infrastructure project to implement 
the Global Maritime Fulcrum and especially 
marine highway shows impact on increasing 
trend of government spending on infrastructure. 
In APBN-P 2016, infrastructure spending 
increased by 9% from previous year. The rise of 
government spending in the fiscal year of 2016 
appeared to be unchanging even though there was 
budget cutting before second quarter began.  
 The budget spending eventually 
affected several projects in the second phase 
of budget cutting. This cutting resulted in 
reschedule or slow down the construction of 
some of the infrastructure project like Madiun-
Kedungbanteng double-track project in East Java, 
and the Makassar-Parepare railway construction 
in South Sulawesi.  
 Effect of decreasing source of state 
budget even admitted by the Ministry of Public 
Works and Public Housing, which the official 
said the impact varies from disrupting or delay of 
the completion of some multi years project (PwC 
Indonesia, 2016, 7). Despite the cut in 2016, 
the fiscal budget of 2017 indicates allocation 
of IDR 287.73 trillion (around US$ 30 billion) 
for infrastructure development. Such amount 
of allocation of capital is the highest budget to 
spend which reveals an increase of 22% from the 
previous year.
  KPPIP has decided to spend the allocated 
money for funding 30 prioritized projects from 
2016 to 2019 (HKTDC Research, 2017). For total 
of 245 projects and 2 programs under the list of 
the national strategic project, KPPIP estimates 
the total cost will reach IDR 4.197 trillion. The 
required capital could be shared among state 
budget (IDR 525 trillion), SOEs (owned by 
central government or local government, IDR 
1, 258 trillion), and private source (IDR 2,414 
trillion) (KPPIP, 2017). 
 The conditions as mentioned above 
indicate that Indonesia could not stand alone in 
order to achieve its strategic project. Not only 
domestic problems remain critical hindrance for 
successfully completed the target of sea highway 
project, but the project has enforced Indonesia 
to be more effortful in creating opportunity with 
international counterparts. Internal connectivity in 
marine highway may attract global investor while 
concomitantly required domestic attentiveness 
towards coordinated economic diplomacy.
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C O N G R U E N C Y  O F  G L O B A L 
MARITIME FULCRUM AND 21ST 
M A R I T I M E  S I L K  R O A D  A N D 
INDONESIA-CHINA RELATIONS
 Indonesia and China in the early 
21st century commenced warmer bilateral 
relations. President SBY has successfully 
contributed in building a solid foundation of 
the countries by signing a strategic partnership 
(April 2005) that in subsequent years elevated to a 
comprehensive strategic partnership (November 
2013) (Mingming & Xiaochun, 2015). President 
SBY signed two important agreements with 
two different China’s leaders. In 2005, SBY’s 
counterparts from China was President Hu 
Jintao, while in 2013 (Chongbo, 2011, 132), 
SBY shake a deal with President Xi Jinping. The 
two agreements were signed during two special 
occasions. The first one was held in Bandung 
after the commemoration of 50 years of Asia 
Africa Conference, which also celebrated as 50 
years of bilateral relations between two countries 
(Sinaga, 2015, 3). The second agreement was 
reached after the first official visit of President Xi 
Jinping after assuming the presidency in March 
the same year. During the visit, Presiden Xi 
also made a public speech in front of Indonesia 
Parliament about 21st Maritime Silk Road and 
proposed to Presiden SBY about his plan to 
establish later known Asia Infrastructure and 
Investment Bank (AIIB) (Indonesia, China forge 
comprehensive strategic partnership in various 
field, 2013). Under President Jokowi, Indonesia 
and China agreed to strengthen comprehensive 
strategic partnership in March 2015, in which 
maritime partnership gains special attention 
(MOFA Republic of Indonesia, 2015).
 The expansion of bilateral relations 
between Indonesia and China was preceded by 
the growing activity of both countries in various 
international forum. Under the President SBY, 
Indonesia activism in international forum became 
more prominent. Besides the strategic partnership 
with China, Indonesia made many strategic 
partnership agreements, like with India (2005) 
(Brewster, 2011, 232), New Asia Africa Strategic 
Partnership (NAASP) (2005) (MOFA Republic of 
Indonesia, 2011), Japan (2006) (MOFA of Japan, 
2006), South Korea (2006) (MOFA Republic of 
Indonesia, 2007), Vietnam (2013) (Vietnam, RI 
to upgrade, 2013; Tuan, 2013). President Jokowi 
also extended the agreement of comprehensive 
partnership (2010) by signing a strategic 
partnership with the US during his state visit 
to Washington in 2015 (Parameswaran, 2015). 
Foreign policy approach that focuses on building 
special agreement with immediate neighbor 
countries is part of maintaining Indonesia’s 
concentric foreign policy and securing its security 
and economic interest (Anwar, 2013, 11).
 Even though China launched its 21st 
Maritime Silk Road in late of SBY’s presidency, it 
could not be neglected the role of MP3EI of SBY 
administration in reorienting Indonesia focus on 
infrastructure. It might be China’s moves that 
firstly seen Indonesia strategic role in supporting 
the idea of the regional sea-route connectivity. 
Jokowi’s administration in this context plays his 
role in accentuating the infrastructure program 
towards more maritime rather than just hub-
spoke between the islands in Indonesia, which 
eventually affects the awareness of responding 
the geoeconomic and geopolitical change in 
the regions. The vision brought Indonesia more 
aware of its potential as a fulcrum of two oceans 
and continents.
 Since the 21st Maritime Silk Road 
is basically about uniting and expanding the 
common interest between China and other 
countries located along the route. The policy 
will concern on activating potential growth 
and achieve mutual benefits in more extensive 
areas. Consequentially the 21st MSR will connect 
China’s port with other countries through 
maritime connectivity, inter-city cooperation and 
economic cooperation (Liu, 2014). The proposed 
sea route spans from ports on the southern coast 
of China through the Red Sea then reach the 
Mediterranean Sea in which it will meet the 
land-based Silk Road in Venice. Thus, there 
will be two elements of Silk Road, land-based 
and maritime based. In the Maritime Silk Road, 
Indonesia will become one important partner 
since the archipelagic state has strategic sea-route 
in the connectivity scheme. The decision of 
President Xi Jinping to give a speech in front of 
Indonesian Parliament about the 21st Maritime 
Silk Road symbolically shows the vital position 
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of Indonesia under the China’s plan (Zhao, 2015, 
22).
 In his speech in front of Indonesia’s 
Parliament, President Xi Jinping emphasized 
five strategic areas. In his brief, President Xi 
Jinping focused on the needs and supporting 
principles required in his proposal. It includes 
trust; win-win solution; a principle of assisting 
and helping among all the participant countries; 
enhancement of mutual understanding and 
friendship; and finally, the principle of openness 
and inclusiveness. President Xi understands that 
the proposal he brings will needs support from 
China’s surrounding neighbor. The Maritime 
Silk road also, as he elaborates further, will 
include the aspect of multiculturalism since it will 
embrace countries from the wide-ranging region 
and different cultural background. In his speech, 
President Xi Jinping also mentioned about the 
ASEAN-China Maritime Fund as one of China’ 
support for regional development that congruent 
with his ideas (Xi, 2013).
 The China’s proposal has an element 
of history in it since it will recreate the success 
of ancient China during the kingdom era. Not 
only in the sense of recreating the trade route 
of Admiral Zheng He but also it should notice 
that the intended course of the 21st Maritime 
Silk Road in the ancient time was recorded as 
prosperous zone before colonization dominated 
those ports and city (Penennungi, 2015, 5-6). 
There is optimism that the ancient spirit could 
be reinvigorated. Nevertheless, there is also 
skepticism about the lack of original spirit 
of ancient silk-road compare to the modern 
maritime silk-road (Koh, 2015).
 However, overemphasizing on the 
historical construct of Silk Road project invites 
critics. According to Tai Wei Lim, “the constructed 
nature of the Silk Road is a clear fact.” He 
elaborates further his argument by citing that 
even both maritime and land-based Silk Road are 
modern scholar invention. The term “maritime 
silk road” firstly comes from Japanese scholars 
who studied the maritime ceramics trade in the 
1970s. Land-based Silk Road which connected 
mainland China to Central Asia up to Europe 
was about the supply chain of trade through 
myriad intermediate traders. Based on those 
findings, Lim concurs that “Beijing’s version 
of OBOR is a conscious state-constructed route 
(Lim, 2016, 78). The nostalgic narration since 
then could not overlook the needs to building 
good-neighborliness with all those countries 
involved in the policy (Zhao, 2015, 1).
 In comparison with Indonesia’s Global 
Maritime fulcrum, China’s 21st Maritime Silk 
Road gives more attention on building its global 
connectivity, while the Indonesia’s connectivity 
proposal is about national development but in 
parallel with the dynamic of extensive East Asia 
regional dynamic. The vision could be discerned 
in the five pillars of Global Maritime Fulcrum 
announce by President Jokowi (2015) (Sambhi, 
2015, 41). Dewi Fortuna Anwar regards the 
global maritime fulcrum contains an element 
of foreign policy, as well as an economic 
development strategy, while at the same time an 
aspect of defense strategy (Heriyanto, 2015).
 Leaders and high officials from Indonesia 
mostly perceive the development of two strategies 
as complementary and mutually supportive. On 2 
November 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi on his 
official visit and met with President Jokowi and 
his counterparts Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi 
comment that, “Jokowi’s vision of Indonesia as 
a maritime fulcrum could complement Beijing’s 
new Maritime Silk Road.” He added that both 
plans aim to strengthen maritime connectivity 
and enhance the capacity of countries in Southeast 
Asia to maximize security and the management of 
maritime resources. China would enthusiastically 
participate in Indonesia’s aim to be a maritime 
power, mainly by assisting with infrastructure 
development. President Jokowi commented 
that “Indonesia is on the way of developing 
into a maritime power, while China proposes 
to build the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st 
century; the two initiatives highly fit with each 
other” (Zhao, 2015, 22-23). Though President 
Jokowi also added his previous comment with 
a rather nationalistic tone and his pro-people 
policy, “so long as the principle of sovereignty 
is safeguarded, and the people benefit, we can 
work together” (Hussein, 2014) 
 The 21st Maritime Silk Road will involve 
17.9 percent of China total trade. The aspect of 
people-to-people connectivity will create more 
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opportunity for people movement of more than 15 
million between China and ASEAN alone (Liu, 
2014). In a total of the 21st MSR, it will cover 
a total population of 3 billion people. China’s 
Ministry of Commerce estimates it will involve 
26% percent of total China’s foreign trade (Clover 
& Hornby, 3015). In the period of 2015 alone, 
China and ASEAN have been connected by more 
than 1,000 flights. The description could be more 
complicated when another mode of transportation 
is added to the picture since many people in the 
region remain utilizing traditional naval and 
river transport. Sub-state level cooperation has 
been growing by the relation among municipal 
level in the region which reached 140 twin cities 
established between ASEAN and China (Do & 
Ha, 2015, 88-89). Such potential and description 
like that is what Minister Wang Yi calls out his 
visit to Indonesia is about connectivity (Chinese 
Embassy in Norway, 2014).
 Sister province between Indonesia 
and China has been commenced at least since 
early the 2000s. Inter-province cooperation 
between Indonesia and China comprise of 
trading, agriculture, investment, tourism, and 
technology (Province of Banten, Indonesia, 
2010; FGD Transcript, 2011). Even West Java 
province has connected with four provinces in 
China like Shandon, Heilongjiang, Guangxi and 
Sichuan (Wage, 2017). However, the prospect of 
cooperation comes with hindrance. A problem 
of influx of migrant workers from China to 
Indonesia has emerged, due to certain extent, it 
was pa of the agreement. Some infrastructure 
projects that come with such agreement were 
Suramadu Bridge in East Java and hydro power 
station in Jati Gede in West Java (FGD Transcript, 
2011).
 Complementarity and congruency of the 
21st Maritime Silk Road and the Global Maritime 
Fulcrum more clearly if we consider how 
Indonesia needs support for funding its program. 
China is quite sure capable of supporting 
Indonesia needs on financial and technical skill. 
Good neighborhood policy of China towards 
Indonesia was highlighted during Asia financial 
crisis in late of the 1990s. China contributed by 
providing almost US$4 billion for the affected 
countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and South Korea (Copper, 2016, 148). Since 
China becomes a dialogue partner of ASEAN, 
its role in supporting development in ASEAN 
countries has been increasing significantly. Trade 
between China and the members of ASEAN 
have increased especially after ACFTA (ASEAN 
China Free Trade). Since the implementation of 
the free trade agreement, China moved to become 
ASEAN’s largest trading partner, while ASEAN 
positioned as China’s third largest trading partner 
(Hermawan, 2015, 31-32).
 Financial  power as the primary 
instrument may be the source of China upper 
hand in Indonesia’s global maritime fulcrum. 
As mentioned before, China already allocated 
funds and founding institution to deliver the 
power to regional countries that surely needed 
help to boost infrastructure development. There 
are Maritime Silk Road Fund and AIIB. The 
AIIB was built under resistance of US for it 
may exclude the US and become the instrument 
for China to exert its influence over regional 
countries (Perlez, 2014). However, after several 
western countries, like UK, Australia, South 
Korea and joined the bank, it may become more 
multilateralized. China’s funding institution may 
as well play as an alternative for the western 
dominated financial institution like World Bank, 
IMF, and ADB (Lim, 2016, 65). The capacity 
of AIIB could take up the lag of capacity of the 
western financial institution. Global management 
consulting firm McKinsey & Co estimates that 
capital needed for infrastructure in the East 
Asian region itself is about US$ 10 trillion 
between 2010-2020 (Bai, 2014). The established 
financial institution like the ADB and World 
Bank, according to The Economist, only holds 
available funding for infrastructure around US$ 
160 billion and US$ 223 billion (Hermawan, 
2015, 32). Another advantage of AIIB is that it 
could be represented the interests of developing 
countries with a focus on “infrastructure and 
connectivity” and less enforcing to borrowers on 
liberal precept like the western lead institutions 
(Wong, 2016).
 Indonesia under President Jokowi 
welcomed the founding of AIIB and definitely 
aims for alternative funding for its maritime and 
infrastructure ambition. Indonesia would plan 
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to secure more than US $ 1.8 billion of loans 
from AIIB. China’s company also welcomed 
in Indonesia even though criticism about the 
practice in acquiring project, low-level quality of 
the completed project, and practice of importing 
low evel migrant workers from China have risen 
(Syailendra, 2017, 7). Despite the fact that China’s 
eagerness to support Indonesia infrastructure and 
maritime projects, another point made by senior 
scholars from Indonesia C.P.F Luhulima who 
worried about a superimposition of China’s 
MSR towards Indonesia’s GMF. This could be 
discerned if the latter may become integral parts 
of China’s MSR, while Indonesia lost its position 
to bargain (Luhulima, 2014).
 On the congruency and interest of 
Sino-Indonesia related to infrastructure and 
maritime cooperation, Tai Wei Lim of SIM 
University Singapore categorizes it under three 
type of possible relations. The first one schemes 
the relations of Sino-Indonesia on the China’s 
interest in “New Normal.” The China’s needs to 
keep domestic production, and secure market in 
neighboring states are behind this perspective. 
The second scenario predicts relation of both 
maritime projects as on the pragmatic interest 
of Indonesia to secure financial support from 
the China’s lead funding institution. The third 
scenario discerns the relations on strategic 
interest Indonesia under MSR while at the same 
time securing its position to manage the building 
up integrated connectivity under centrality 
of ASEAN (Lim, 2016, 66). Three possible 
perspectives of Sino-Indonesia relations are 
quite discernible while the strategic calculation 
is on the capacity of Indonesia to keep its foreign 
policy maneuvers open. In the next part of the 
article, it will focus on option for Indonesia to 
manage its middlepowermanship under a rather 
superimposition situation of the 21st Maritime 
Silk Road towards Indonesia GMF.
SBY’S LEGACY AND CHALLENGES 
OF INDONESIA’S MIDDLE POWER 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JOKOWI’S 
PRESIDENCY
“the relations of major powers are not entirely 
up to them. Middle and smaller powers too can 
help lock the major powers into this durable 
architecture.”
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – 
Shangrila Dialogue 2012
 Indonesia’s foreign policy after 32 
years under authoritarian regime has undergone 
dynamic experiment though it remains intact 
with its norms as well as identity, free and active 
foreign policy. The idea has been set up since 
the speech of Vice President M. Hatta in front 
of Indonesian provisional parliament (KNIP) in 
1948 (Anwar, 1990, 227). Indonesia’s foreign 
policy since the infancy of the republics cannot be 
separated from the norms (Laksmana, 2011, 162). 
However, the historical facts show that Indonesia 
did not become immune from the left and right 
leaning in its foreign policy. From Soekarno up 
to Soeharto, Indonesia’s claim to maintain its 
free and active foreign policy. Despite the claims, 
under Soekarno Indonesia is more leaning to 
newly independent countries and maintain close 
relations with Beijing and Moscow. Contrast 
to that era, due to the economic problem at 
the onset of his administration, Soeharto kept 
his foreign policy closer towards the western 
country for securing his ideas of economic 
development (Tan, 2007, 153-158). Even though 
the two leaders have taken a different path, both 
of the leaders keep maintains the identity of 
non-alignment and pro-developing/post-colonial 
countries. Bandung spirits remain the corners 
stone of Indonesia’s foreign policy although with 
different accentuation (Tan, 2007, 160).
 After quite successfully managed 
democratic transition, Indonesian foreign policy 
also affected not only by the changing dynamic 
of balance of power and regional architecture. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy aims as well to 
maintain economic development after surviving 
from Asian Financial crisis. Complexities of 
foreign policy making, and decision related to 
that matters become higher due to impermeable 
capacity of international economic situation with 
domestic situation. President SBY in his initial 
years of his administration called this uncertain 
terrain of foreign policy as “turbulent ocean.” 
In his speech in 2005, President SBY coined 
the term of “navigating the turbulent ocean” in 
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referring dynamic of international system and 
increasing linkage of international and domestic 
issues.
 During his ten years of presidency, SBY 
has been fortunate to have two excellent foreign 
ministers. Minister Hassan Wirajuda and Minister 
Marty Natalegawa have lead Indonesia MOFA 
with managing ability that could complement 
SBY’s attention on this matter. Under SBY’s 
first term of presidency, Minister Wirajuda has 
put solid institutional foundation for Indonesia’s 
MOFA to keep intact with global challenges, and 
he introduced the term of intermestic and focused 
on public diplomacy (Pattiradjawane, 2016, 3). In 
SBY’s second term, Minister Marty Natalegawa 
proposed a concept of “dynamic equilibrium” 
which could be defined as non-dominated 
regional dynamic with stressing on capability 
of small and medium countries to keep the 
balance among great power politics. Natalegawa 
mentioned the concept in an interview with The 
Jakarta Post daily related to East Asia Summit 
May 2010 (Pattiradjawane, 2010).
 Bes ides  those  bas ic  normat ive 
foundations, Indonesia’s foreign policy also based 
on geopolitical and geostrategic consideration. 
Indonesia’s vision of regional stability was 
implemented on the foundation of ASEAN under 
Soeharto administration. Since the early of the 
1970s, one of Indonesia’s prominent scholars 
Soedjatmoko has proposed the idea of dynamic 
equilibrium. This initial version of dynamic 
equilibrium is rather synonymous with the 
concept of Minister Natalegawa (Soedjatmoko 
1972a, 15-16; Soedjatmoko 1972b, 37). The 
distinction of the two ideas is more on period 
of Cold War international system and current 
transitional power in new millennium, and 
especially the growing significance of complex 
interdependence among the East Asian countries. 
Concentric circle of foreign policy, therefore, 
could be named as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. The implementation of this 
policy has been commenced since Soeharto’s 
administration by focusing on ASEAN centrality. 
Thus, dynamic equilibrium and ASEAN centrality 
could be discerned as a combination of balance of 
power consideration, complex interdependence, 
and normative consideration built under ASEAN 
institution (Roberts & Widyaningsih, 2015, 274; 
A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, 2010).
 One important foreign policy lexicon 
that has been introduced into Indonesia’s foreign 
policy in the middle power approach. Even 
though the activism could be traced back to early 
days of the republic (Kusumaningprang 2017, 
152-179), the utilizing concept by Indonesian 
official could be said taken by SBY’s speech 
in 2012 (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2012). 
Besides a literally used of the concept of a 
middle power country, SBY has come out with 
a concept of bridge builder. Operationalization 
of the concept could be perceived as bridging 
between developing countries and developed 
countries like when he delivered speech in front 
of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Havana, 
Cuba (2006). Indonesia also plays such a role 
in the western world and Islamic world after 
the US campaign of Global War on Terror (Tan, 
2007, 173). The role taken by Indonesia could 
be said to have similarities with the concept of 
middlepowermanship proposed by international 
scholars, in a sense that it contains element 
of good global citizenship (Cox, 1989, 862). 
However, Santikajaya comments that the bridge 
builder and middlepowermanship could be 
perceived as two different concepts since the 
bridger builder clearly makes a distance from 
being supportive to the US like the role of 
Canada and Australia (Santikajaya, 2016, 568). 
In addition to that comparison, Santikajaya 
distinguishes Indonesia’s bridge builder role with 
the revisionist ambition of BRICS countries. In 
this case, Indonesia is only assumed to play a soft 
revisionist towards global order while at the same 
time play normative bridge builder (Santikajaya, 
2016, 570).
 The above mention legacy for Indonesia’s 
foreign policy could be neglected by Jokowi’s 
administration. Despite the urgent need for 
supply of funds and investment, Indonesia 
must be able to face the challenge of balancing 
between the economic and political interest in 
context of developing Global Maritime Fulcrum 
mega-project (Pattiradjawane, 2016, 6-10). 
Jokowi’s administration also faces the challenge 
of coordination and management of perception 
among his ministry and supporting government 
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agency (Syailendra, 2017, 12). After all of those 
challenges, Jokowi’s and his administration 
must be able to manage the dynamic of domestic 
institutional politics in democratic Indonesia. 
Managing criticism from the opposition in 
parliament, range of local administration under 
decentralized Indonesia (Wicaksana, 2017, 6-10), 
and domestic public opinion (Pattiradjawane, 
2016, 16-17), are among the crucial factors 
should be his priority before he could gain 
international support.
 Citing from several Jokowi’s speeches 
about his Global Maritime Fulcrum ambition, 
it could be noticed that he already understands 
the challenge of keeping Indonesia’s dynamic 
equilibrium doctrine intact. Global Maritime 
Fulcrum based on his speech in Myanmar (2014). 
He clearly mentioned the changing of regional 
dynamics based on the rise of China’s power in 
global politics, and extended regionalism towards 
Indo-Pacific region (Witular, 2014a).
 Notwithstanding the understanding of the 
external situation, Jokowi should pay attention 
towards managing dynamic equilibrium in his 
economic diplomacy due to attractiveness and 
complementarity of his program with regional 
and major power plans. At the same period of 
his announcement of his GMF, there are already 
several similar projects could be fitted with 
Indonesia’s plan. To name a few are the Master 
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) (Negara 
& Das, 2017, 5), Japan-India’s Indo-Pacific 
(Wicaksana, 2017, 12), and especially China’s 
OBOR (One Belt One Road) or Belt Road 
Initiatives. Since the commencement of Global 
Maritime Fulcrum, it could be said that regional 
competition to support the program has been 
started especially in the case of China and Japan 
in terms of infrastructure project, and between 
China and the US in terms of natural resources 
investment (Wicaksana 2017, 12, 14). So it could 
concur that GMF itself pose a new challenge for 
credibility of Indonesia’s dynamic equilibrium.
The competitions are other challenges that 
might have been overlooked by Jokowi’s, or it 
may as well become a challenge to strategically 
implement the dynamic equilibrium. Despite 
the speculation, the fact is that Jokowi could not 
abandon the path of his predecessor and public 
perception, as well as hiding behind his rhetoric 
of pragmatic foreign policy like, “down to earth 
diplomacy” (MOFA Republic of Indonesia, 
2015, 57), since the challenges now have become 
concentrated on how to manage the sustainability 
of his mega project and keeping the centrality of 
ASEAN.
 More importantly, it is Jokowi and Jusuf 
Kalla who inserted the term middle power in 
their campaign program during the presidential 
election in 2014. At the same document, Jokowi 
explained the role of Indonesia as middle power 
should be achieved through selectively engage 
regional and global issues while at other points 
he expected to broaden the concentric circle 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy to anticipate the 
prospect of Indo-Pacific. In the detail of the 
program, Jokowi and team seem recognize the 
centrality of ASEAN, and utilizing both strategic 
bilateral and multilateral forum (Widodo & Kalla, 
2014, 13-14).
 While boosting global maritime fulcrum 
as primary program and catching up with the 
lagging infrastructure development require 
special attention to domestic problem due to huge 
obstacle related to coordination problem, Jokowi’s 
administration has to consider that international 
dynamics could hamper his program. Balancing 
is required, thus not only from economic and 
political interest, but alongside international and 
domestic, and intermestic problem as well. As it 
happens in the way Jokowi’s decision to join the 
AIIB and China’s lead financial institution. The 
single decision could have influence on how he 
tackles issue of securing financial institution for 
infrastructure development, playing bridging 
role between developing countries and the 
western institution that needs to be reform due 
to “democratic deficit” and lack of voice of 
Southern countries, but also to ensure that the 
new AIIB will not dominated by single country. 
Despite the fact, some of Jokowi’s foreign policy 
tag line could be considered as criticism of over-
activism of SBY’s foreign policy that contradict 
his indecisiveness on managing domestic issue, 
Jokowi’s have to remains aware of the big 
pictures of his foreign policy rather than tackling 
foreign policy and domestic issue as piecemeal 
approach under pragmatic rhetoric. 
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 Referring to three possible scenarios 
on previous part of this article (Lim, 2016, 
66), Jokowi have to choose between becoming 
superimposed by China’s Maritime Silk Road, 
keeping pragmatic foreign policy for the sake 
of infrastructure development while neglecting 
dynamic equilibrium, and keeping his program 
sustain while managing the centrality of ASEAN 
through cooperation under MPAC.
CONCLUSION 
Infrastructure development in Indonesia 
could be a breakthrough after several years 
lag behind other countries. Jokowi’s decision 
to focus on global maritime culture has to 
be seen as a strategy to catch up with that. 
However, infrastructure has pushed Indonesia 
on the condition of opening its domestic 
economy for international actor to participate. 
Huge gaps between the availability of national 
capital and the total of financial needs for 
infrastructure development has enforced 
Indonesia’s government to slim its bureaucratic 
system and creating special agency to accelerate 
the development. The government of Indonesia 
could stand alone to fill the financial gaps, even 
with the participation of national private sectors. 
This challenge certainly needs an international 
cooperation to support the program. 
 In strategic context global maritime 
fulcrum is the way Indonesia encounter the 
dynamic and balance of power in the regional. 
The sea highway is a supporting element of that 
strategy that supposed to be domestically oriented 
before it could be used to support capability 
of Indonesia under such turbulent region. 
Notwithstanding the domestic and economic 
focus of the sea highway has been proven it could 
create a problem that shows how international 
and domestic issues are interrelated. Indonesia 
needs to put more attention on domestic problem 
since it was due to lack of coordination among 
national actors that become the main obstacle to 
implementation of MP3EI. Jokowi leadership and 
his idiosyncratic of do-able mentality recently 
have become the engine to solve the chronic 
problem. Nevertheless, Jokowi leadership seems 
to focus on pragmatic and piecemeal approach 
and pay less attention to the intermestic aspect 
of the sea highway project, and Global Maritime 
Fulcrum in general. 
An increasing of China’s participation in 
the infrastructure project in Indonesia initially was 
a modest international partnership as commonly 
among nation. The strategic partnership between 
two countries was a solid foundation for the 
two countries to develop more substantial 
cooperation. Built upon several mutually agreed 
basic norms such as Bandung Spirits and focus 
on infrastructure and connectivity, Indonesia and 
China have been perceived quickly moves to 
be a more comprehensive partnership. The two 
countries have common interest, yet they also 
have so many differences and problem between 
them. There was deficit of trust from Indonesian 
people towards the way Chinese companies 
operate in Indonesia, and certain problem 
related to p-to-p that comes out after increasing 
connectivity between two countries. Capability 
gap between Indonesia and China has made a 
number Indonesian decision maker, and scholars 
look cautiously on growing relations, especially 
on the so-called similarities of 21st Maritime 
Silk Road and Global Maritime Fulcrum. There 
is a concern of Indonesia’s maritime project 
become superimposed by China’s maritime 
because of China has a better position to driven 
and put Indonesia’s maritime project as merely 
complement. At the possible scenario, Indonesia 
could play a more strategic role in the idea of 
connectivity, whether it comes from China, 
ASEAN, or other players in the region. The 
idea connectivity should be welcome as long 
as it could serve for the betterment of people 
and keeping ASEAN at the center of regional 
architecture and the dynamic equilibrium remains 
stable.
Those two problems managing China’s 
involvement in positive dynamic equilibrium 
should be the concern of President Jokowi. 
Indonesia should keep its option to cooperate 
openly. The decision to joint AIIB is part 
of that idea, to keep the optional financing 
support open. But more importantly, Indonesia 
should maintain the role of bridge builder as an 
aspiration of its middlepowermanship. Therefore, 
managing credibility among all participants of 
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possible financial supporter has to be kept intact. 
Indonesia’s membership in AIIB could become 
a mechanism to play this role by not only to 
secure the possibility of financial support for 
infrastructure but to serve Indonesia activism as 
a bridge builder between the new bank and the 
established financial institution. Indonesia should 
consider that its idea of connectivity could have a 
complementability with various program as long 
as Indonesia could play its idea of fulcrum or a 
bridge builder.
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